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CONTINUITY OR CHANGE? A DOCTRINAL FACET 
OF THE U. S. FOREIGN POLICY
Doctrine: that which is taught or laid down as true concerning 
a particular subject or department of knowledge, as religion, 
politics, science, etc.; a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, tenet. 
Oxford English Dictionary1
1 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
2 J. G. Heinberg, Continuity and Change in European Governments, “Journal of Politics, ” vol. 8, no. 3, 
1946, pp. 392-404. 
3 For further debate on structural realist approach see: M. P. Lagon, The International System and the 
Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to "Freedom Fighters"?, “British Journal of Political Science, ” 
vol. 22, no. 1, 1992, pp. 39-70. 
If things are going to remain the same around here, there are going 
to have to be some changes made. 
Italian maxim
The question of continuity and change is one of the most stimulating issues in political 
science. This is particularly true in the context of foreign policy. In internal affairs, in spite 
of such crucial events as World War II, one may, surprisingly, deal with elements of conti­
nuity, while in foreign affairs-with elements of change. 2 Therefore, the issue of continuity 
and change seems to occur as a core question in U. S. politics, especially in its external 
dimension. Analysing this topic allows as to answer some vital questions. Among the most 
important are: (1) What components constitute the politics of “continuity” and what of 
“change”? (2) When do we deal with periods of continuity and when with periods of 
change? (3) What premises may be anticipated based on this analysis? 
U. S. foreign policy seems to be one of the most promising areas for the study of the 
above-mentioned questions. The doctrines of Monroe, Hoover and Stimson, Truman, 
Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and currently Bush, give us clues that help us observe the 
elements of change and continuation in the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy since the 1820s till now. In dealing with the doctrines, the analysis would poten­
tially lack the biases caused by using a structural realist approach. Although “the realist 
explanation. [... ] demonstrates how the international environment shapes the realm of the 
possible in American foreign-policy doctrines, ” still, an approach focusing on the role of 
leaders, leadership and ideology is used in this paper. 3
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Naturally, the above-mentioned doctrines are not a complete set of American doc­
trines. For pragmatic reasons, the doctrines that contain essentially new elements were 
chosen. Therefore, the Kennedy doctrine and the Carter doctrine were rejected as being 
only “geographical” modifications of the Truman doctrine and the Eisenhower doctrine. 4 
Clinton doctrine was also omitted, as having mostly an economic dimension. 
4 Cf. with S. E. Ambrose, The Presidency and Foreign Policy, “Foreign Affairs, ” vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 
1991/92. 
5 The co-author of the doctrine was John Quincy Adams, then-secretary of state. Surprisingly, the origins 
of the doctrine are British; for further details see: J. W. Fawcett, The Origin and Text of the Famous Monroe 
Doctrine, “Congressional Digest, ” March 1939, pp. 74-77. 
6 W. I. Cohen, B. Perkins, W. LaFeber, A. Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: 
The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
p. 73. 
The doctrines we are going to deal with are already well known to researchers. There­
fore, for this analysis it is enough only to recall their basic premises. 
The Monroe Doctrine
The first part of the 19th century is called a “continental” era in the history of US foreign 
policy. Territorial strengthening was the main priority for the young republic. The doctrine 
announced by President James Monroe on December 2, 1823 served this purpose. 5 The 
roots of the doctrine were in European affairs, or, more precisely, European colonies in 
North America. The United States realised that the weakening influence of Spain might 
cause the interest of other European powers towards Spanish territories. Not wishing to 
become a passive player, the U. S. decided to join the game. According to President Mon­
roe, the United States did not have to meddle in the European powers’ internal matters. On 
the other hand, it was essential to keep friendly relations with Europe, especially in eco­
nomic relations. The U. S. would not call into question the European powers’ rights to 
already established colonies in the Western Hemisphere. But any attempts to broaden the 
colonies’ boundaries would be treated as a threat to vital American interests. Therefore, 
the Monroe Doctrine “led the United States to be the policeman of the [Western] hemi­
sphere. ”6 It served the purpose of strengthening the position of the United States on the 
American continent. 
Although the Monroe Doctrine is often referred to as “isolationism, ” it has to be men­
tioned that this term carries some simplification. If one uses the notion “isolationism, ” it 
should be pointed out that it does not automatically mean complete passivity in interna­
tional relations. The doctrine contains activity, though in a limited area (Western Hemi­
sphere) and limited sphere (political affairs). Keeping in mind this meaning of isolation­
ism, we may conclude that the United States could afford it: America was - literally and 
metaphorically speaking - far from Europe and its balance of power. 
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The Hoover - Stimson Doctrine
We must move to the 20th century to say anything about the next doctrine. In the 20th 
century the U. S. A, became an ambitious, although still rather provincial, player on the 
international scene. The region, itself, to which the doctrine was applied - China - clearly 
shows how American aspirations had changed. 
Because of Japanese activity in East Asia, some countries - including the United States
- felt anxious about it. On January 7, 1932 the U. S. secretary of state - Henry Stimson - 
submitted a diplomatic note to Japan and China. It was declared that the United States did 
not recognise any activities violating China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is 
symptomatic that there were no sanctions provided for violating the note’s provisions. The 
Hoover - Stimson Doctrine represents a pacifist, idealistic attitude towards international 
relations between Word War I and Word War II. The Briand-Kellog Pact serves as proof of 
this. 
Implementation of the Hoover - Stimson Doctrine occurred only one month later, when 
the Japanese army landed in the port of Shanghai. This activity did not cause any decisive 
reaction from any countries, including the U. S. Therefore, the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine 
only kept up appearances of American activity. 
The Truman Doctrine
Similar to the two doctrines above, the Truman Doctrine is also ascribed to the secretary of 
state (Dean Acheson). The Truman Doctrine was the first which expressed the U. S. ’ atti­
tude towards communism. On March 12, 1947, in a message delivered to both chambers of 
Congress, President Harry Truman expressed the fear that a void after collapsing British 
Empire might have been filled with Soviet influences. Thus, the bipolar system was emerg­
ing. In one part of the world the way of life was based upon “terror and oppression, 
a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. ”7 
The rest of the world was the so-called “free world” with its “free institutions, representa­
tive government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression. ”8 Particular tasks for the U. S. followed 
such a diagnosis. 
7 Cit. in: http: //www. presidency. ucsb. edu/site/docs/pppus. php? admm=033&year=1947&id=56 (June 23, 
2007). 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Ibidem. 
The key question in fighting against communism was - according to President Truman
- supporting “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
by outside pressures. ”9 Although at that time it mainly concerned Greece and Turkey, the 
United States’ active policy became the determinant of its attitude towards world commu­
nism sponsored by the Kremlin. 
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The Eisenhower Doctrine
On January 5, 1957, in a special message to Congress, President Dwight Eisenhower 
presented his vision of constraining communist influences. This time, the Middle East was 
the focus of attention. The president suggested a three-level approach. First, it was neces­
sary to co-operate with countries of that region in their economic transformation in order to 
keep them independent from communist threats. Secondly, military assistance would 
be provided for those countries that asked for it. And, thirdly, in such a necessity, it would 
be possible to enter American troops into the Middle East. Congress agreed to such 
a scenario. 10 It was implemented in the middle of 1958 when the United States decided 
to intervene in Lebanon. 
10 On March 9, 1957, the President signed the “Resolution promoting peace and stability in the Middle 
East” (PL 85-7). 
11 Cit. in: http: //www. presidency. ucsb. edu/site/docs/pppus. php? admin=037&year=1969&id=279 (June 23, 
2007). 
12 Cit. in: Public Papers of Ronald Reagan. Washington, D. C.: Federal Register Division, National Ar­
chives and Records Service, 1985, http: //www. reagan. utexas. edu/resource/speeches/1985/20685e. htm (July 4, 
2007). 
The Nixon Doctrine
The main author of the American foreign policy of Nixon’s time was Henry Kissinger. 
Formally National Security Advisor, he was a crucial person in the bureaucracy of U. S. 
foreign affairs. Naturally, the Nixon Doctrine followed the Vietnam War. Because of the 
lack of any perspectives for finding a solution to the Vietnamese knot, President Richard 
Nixon and his advisors decided to re-formulate the main Vietnam policy issues. During the 
press conference on July 25, 1969, in Guam, R. Nixon declared that the U. S. would 
actively fulfil its obligations, but that the means would change. According to the presiden­
tial declaration, the United States should “assist, but not dictate. ”11 Therefore the main 
military effort would have to be carried out by engaged countries. The term “vietnamization” 
was proposed. 
The Nixon Doctrine clearly indicated the limits of American power. In the face of 
difficulties with fighting against communist forces, the United States developed the policy 
of adapting, and reacting, but not creating, or shaping, the situation. 
The Reagan Doctrine
On February 6, 1985, President Ronald Reagan delivered an address before a joint session 
of the Congress on the State of the Union. Most of the speech dealt with social and eco­
nomic security, whereas foreign policy played a minor role. Almost at the end, in five 
laconic sentences, the plan - later called “the Reagan Doctrine” - was introduced. The 
essence of it was: “to support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own 
security. ”12 This time Central America (Nicaragua) was the focus. Following this declara­
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tion, the United States backed up local forces in their fight against communist guerrillas. 
As for Nicaragua, such support was offered to contras as early as 1981. So, the Reagan 
Doctrine may be summed by the popular saying: “our enemy’s enemy is our friend. ”
The Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine is the last included in this analysis. It was formally expressed in the 
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (NSS) - a report released by 
the White House on September 20, 2002. Its importance results from the significance of 
the American foreign policy agenda in the post-9/11 world order. The significance of the 
NSS will probably be as huge as the famous NSC-68 report released in 1950. 
According to official assessment, the Bush Doctrine contains four main elements: the 
pre-emptive use of military force, military domination, so-called “multilateralism” (inter­
national institutions and alliances) and the “export” of democracy. 13
13 See: K. A. Lieber, R. J. Lieber, The Bush National Security Strategy, “U. S. Foreign Policy Agenda. An 
Electronic Journal of the U. S. Department of State, ” vol. 7, no. 4, Dec. 2002, http: //usinfo. state. gov/journals/ 
itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-41ieber. htm (June 26, 2007). On the other hand, according to Z. J. Pietras, the Bush Doctrine 
contains of messianism, unilateralism, militarism and pre-emption; see: Z. J. Pietras, George W. Bush s Doc­
trine and the Structure of Global International Order, “The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, ” vol. 13, 
no. 3, 2004, pp. 11-16. Cf. with R. Jervis, Understand the Bush Doctrine, “Political Science Quarterly, ” vol. 
118, no. 3, pp. 365-88. 
14 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html 
(June 26,2007). For a discussion of the concepts of prevention, pre-emption and anticipatory military action see 
e.g. F. Heisbourg, A Work in Progress. The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, “Washington Quarterly,” vol. 
26, no. 2, 2003, pp. 75-88.
15 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html 
(June 26, 2007).
16 Ibidem.
17 Ibidem. Further explanation of the doctrine goals can be found in: C. L. Powell, A Strategy of Partner­
ships, “Foreign Affairs,” vol. 83, no. 1, January/February 2004.
The most controversial postulate - pre-emption - may be expressed very briefly: “our 
best defense is a good offense. ”14 The pre-emptive actions are planned in response to 
contemporary threats, with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the fore­
front. 
Reacting to these threats requires having commensurate military capabilities. Accord­
ing to the NSS it has to guarantee the maintenance of American democratic values and “to 
create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and 
all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and eco­
nomic liberty. ”15
The third aspect is the “new multilateralism. ” It should be understood as activity based 
on effectively operating international institutions such as UNO, WTO, NATO, and O. A. S. 
On the other hand, the NSS states that if it is necessary “we will not hesitate to act alone. ”16
The last postulate contained in the National Security Strategy concerns the promotion 
of democracy worldwide. Obviously, this is the traditional, American, Jeffersonian ver­
sion of democracy. These activities are devoted to promoting “free and open societies on 
every continent [... ] free markets, and free trade to every comer of the world. ”17
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Continuity or change?
The above-mentioned doctrines allow us to draw some conclusions.
Firstly, generally speaking we can observe continuity in the essence, objectives, goals of 
American foreign policy. If any changes are indicated, they rather apply to terminology, to 
the application of new names to familiar phenomena. Defining communism and terrorism 
as a threat serves this purpose. For some observers, the idea of changes in foreign policy is 
attributable to changes in the premises of power and rather not to changes in the concept of 
the nation’s basic purposes.18 The concept of power seems to be very appealing in that 
matter. According to president Lyndon Johnson “to protect the life of our nation, to pre­
serve the liberty of our citizens, and to pursue the happiness of our people”19 are the basic 
premises of the U.S. foreign policy. But these premises are nothing especially new to any 
of world leaders. Without taking a risk, such goals may be attributed to all of statesmen. 
But as for the United States it must be emphasised that they posses some measures to meet 
these challenges, and power is in the centre of that.
18 S. Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman 
to Johnson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 2.
19 Address by President Johnson to The Associated Press, April 21,1965.
20 On this topic see: G. Lundestad, Uniqueness and Pendulum Swings in US Foreign Policy, “Interna­
tional Affairs,” vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 405-21.
21 Not to mention such non-controversial factors as physical survival, liberty, the American way of life and 
the economic well-being of American society. For further reading see: S. Brown, op.cit., pp. 7-9.
22 See e.g.: R. D. Asmus, Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance, “Foreign Affairs,” vol 82, no. 5, September/ 
October 2003 and D. Moisi, The Real Crisis Over the Atlantic, “Foreign Affairs,” vol 80, no. 4, July/August 
2001.
23 See the Bush Doctrine credo: “The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better” 
in: Overview of America s International Strategy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. An Electronic Journal of the 
U.S. Department of State, vol. 7, no. 4, December 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj 
7-4overview.htm (July 4,2007).
Secondly, there are constant factors in the United States’ foreign policy. The idea of 
democracy, a free market economy, a belief system with an American sense of unique­
ness20 and the concept of a collective security system are merely the best-known examples.21 
Generally speaking, these universal ideas are ever-present elements of American history. 
Their premises may be found as early as Washington’s “Farewell Address” (September 
17, 1796). The question for further debate is how America perceives these fundamental 
purposes.22
Thirdly, the change in American foreign policy is connected with its means, tools, not 
its essence. As for its means, the United States try to find a balance between isolationism 
and interventionism. It should be mentioned that even the Monroe Doctrine - generally 
treated as a synonym for “isolationism” - assumed the possibility of intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere.
To a great extent, the dispute over the roles of idealism and realism overlaps the dis­
pute over isolationism and interventionism (see Fig. 1). Idealism - often called “Wilsonism” 
- is characterised through the activity of multilateral organisations, through faith in the 
good intentions of other countries, and the belief that war is an undeserving means for 
human beings.23 On the other hand, realism may amount to Reagan’s comment “trust, but 
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verify.”24 Just as isolationism and interventionism are in fact complementary concepts,25 
idealism and realism can be connected with each other. The Wilsonian idealistic premises 
that allowed the U.S.A, to enter World War I were backed up by a realistic view. President 
Woodrow Wilson was aware that only those countries that took part in the war would be 
able to shape the post-war world order.
24 For realist explanation of the Reagan Doctrine see: M. P. Lagon, The International System and the 
Reagan Doctrine, “British Journal of Political Science,” vol. 22, no. 1, 1992, pp. 39-70.
25 See e.g.: W. Schneider, ‘‘Rambo’’ and Reality: Having it Both Ways [in:] K. A. Oye et al., Eagle 
Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown, 1987.
26 For further argumentation see respectively: K. A. Lieber, R. J. Lieber, The Bush National Security 
Strategy, and R. F. Grimmett, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force. CRS Report for Congress, September 
18,2002, “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State,” vol. 7, no. 4, 
December 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4grimmett.htm (June 26,2007).
Fig. 1. Idealism/realism and isolationism/interventionism
The dispute also concerns many types of detailed activity - e.g. pre-emption. Accord­
ing to some researchers this has already occurred in US history, while others claim it is 
a postulate without a precedent.26
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To conclude, the above-analysed doctrines show that we may observe continuity in the 
goals of American foreign policy. These goals are identified with the American version of 
democracy. The question that remains is whether these premises are implemented effec­
tively, or even legally. As for change, it may be easily observed in the range of military 
interventions in the Pax Americana region, the attempt to influence China’s policy, the 
containment of communism, the preventing the outbreak of a Third World War, 
“Vietnamization,” supporting contras, and pre-emption.
As was shown above, each doctrine contains elements of continuation and change that 
may be called a “structural regularity.” But the doctrines have a “historical regularity,” 
too. As Fig. 2 shows, they form specific phases of continuity and change. This phenom­
enon is determined by the American raison d’etat. If there is a threat to vital interests, there 
is a swing towards internationalism. On the other hand, when there is a lack of danger, 
politics turn towards an isolationistic trend. The Nixon Doctrine stands as the only excep­
tion.
Since “every President has his own foreign policy,”27 one should expect to deal with 
a new approach with every new President. Having analysed this topic we can view this 
judgement as a serious oversimplification. In spite of changes in the White House we still 
observe continuity in the doctrinal aspect of U.S. foreign policy. What is more, the above- 
-described processes will probably not be changed by the serious challenges we have faced 
in recent years. Continuity and change will for sure be perceptible in their structural and 
historical dimensions. The most obvious explanation is that it is because of the continuity 
in “institutional structures and in social and political values”28 in the United States. But 
history teaches us that continuity in institutional, social and political dimensions within 
one country are not always comprehensive, or even sufficient, explanations. An interna­
tional system has its own role to play. It is one of the factors - like social and political 
values - that influence the formulation of a country’s politics in a continuous manner. 
Therefore, just like other pairs of values in U.S. politics,29 continuity and change are comple­
mentary concepts. This is why American foreign policy should be defined in terms 
of continuity and change, not continuity or change. This conclusion is particularly striking 
if we place a “black-or-white dichotomy” of the American perception of world affairs 
at the centre of analysis.30
27 G. Lundestad, op.cit., p. 417.
28 M. H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, New Heaven, London: Yale University Press, 1987, 
p. 13.
29 For a discussion of other pairs see: K. Krakau, American Foreign Relations: a National Style?, “Diplo­
matic History,” vol. 8, no. 3, 1984, pp. 253-72.
30 Compare this with the opinion that a “dichotomy of black-or-white would appear to be an important 
explanation for the violent shifts of moods in the United States,” G. Lundestad, op.cit., p. 421.
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Fig. 2. Isolationism (-1) and interventionism (1) in the United States foreign policy
Łukasz Wordliczek is associate professor at the Institute of American Studies and Polish 
Diaspora, Jagiellonian University, Ph.D. in political science (the dissertation The United 
States Foreign Policy: An Evolving Presidential Perspective was published in Polish in 
2003). Dr. Ł.Wordliczek specializes in the United States political system, analytical per­
spectives in the U.S. foreign policy and some issues within theory of democracy. His cur­
rent interest is focused on the continuity and change issues in politics and attempts toward 
assessing the quality of democracy. He is the author of numerous articles in Polish and 
English concerning mostly the United States political system and Central/Eastem Euro­
pean politics.

